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1. Introduction 
15 December 2018 was designated by the then President of Ukraine 
Petro Poroshenko as “the day of achieving final independence for 
Ukraine” (SPZh 2018). On that remarkable Saturday in mid-December, bi-
shops of the Kiev Patriarchate (KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Or-
thodox Church (UAOC) assembled in the Church of St Sophia in Kiev, in 
order to start a new Church structure in Ukraine. This event, called the 
Uniting Council, was presided over by Metropolitan Emmanuel (Adama-
kis), hierarch of the Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarchate. The com-
position of the Council reflected the roles and proportional significance of 
the Churches which took part in it. There were 42 bishops from the KP and 
12 from the UAOC (plus accompanying priests and laypeople; however, 
only hierarchs were given the right to vote in the elections for the head of 
this new Church). The presence of the Ukrainian President Petro Poro-
shenko (in office in 2014-2019), who was sitting in the presidium among 
the Church hierarchs, was particularly notable: this was a clear reflection 
of the head of state’s role in the autocephalic process. Although various 
sources predicted that there would be quite a sizeable presence of the 
hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), reality sharply dif-
fered from this prediction: only two hierarchs (out of 97) attended this 
Council, and even their formal membership of the UOC on the day of the 
Council was questionable, since it became known that they were admitted 
in the Constantinople Patriarchate before the Council. 	
The founding of the new Church, which received the name of the 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), was the outcome of a chain of events, 
that followed the April 2018 request from Petro Poroshenko to the 
Patriarch in Istanbul. However, the head of the new Church, elected at the 
Council, could hardly be called a preferential figure for those who orche-
strated this process. Metropolitan Epiphaniy (Dumenko) did not belong to 
the pool of the ideal candidates approved by the Ecumenical Patriarch and 
the Ukrainian President, who would have preferred to see Metropolitan 
Simeon (Shostatskiy) in charge of the OCU. They both canvassed and 
worked for the election of Shostatskiy; but even their efforts and influence 
were not sufficient to overcome the manipulative skills of the KP’s head 
Philaret (Denisenko), who was actively promoting Epiphaniy.  Metropo-
litan Epiphaniy, aged 39 (at the time of his election), became the youngest 
primate of the local Orthodox Church in the world.  
In this article, I shall analyse how and in what context the creation of 
the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine proceeded. The theore-
tical foundation for this analysis has been constructed around key points 
addressing the issues of religion and national identity. Religion is an 
important element of national identity (Mudrov 2016) and, furthermore, 
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the religious affiliation is “one of the main sources shaping people’s 
identities”. The religious identities can be politicised, in order to mobilise 
support for political and religious purposes, and, furthermore, they can be 
securitised (Saleh and Kraetzschmar 2015, 550). In some cases, the 
securitising discourse “simultaneously ties the state to ethnicity/nation-
hood and ethnicity/nationhood to religion” (Tromble 2014, 529).  Conse-
quently, a group, feeling that its identity is under threat, will use various 
means, including force, to defend it. Further complexities may be pro-
voked by the imposition of certain parameters of identity (for example, 
religious affiliation, language, interpretation of history), which are not 
acceptable for a particular section of society (Cram 2009, McLaren 2004). 
This is in line with the theoretical model for nation-state policies, deve-
loped by Stepan, Linz and Yadav, who claim that these policies presuppose 
“various forms of social pressure and coercion” for the assimilation into 
the nation-state identity and preventing “the emergence of alternative 
cultural identities”, or their erosion if they exist. This approach will be 
contrasted with the “state-nation” policies, directed at respect and 
protection of “multiple but complementary sociocultural identities” (Ste-
pan, Linz, and Yadav 2010, 53).	
Our theoretical proposition is that the state-nation policies did not 
acquire adequate support among the Ukrainian ruling elites. On the 
contrary, via the dominance of the nation-state policies, successive 
Ukrainian governments were reinforcing the strength of nationalist 
identity, whilst the canonical Orthodox Church (UOC) was depicted as 
alien. This led to the alienation of a substantial portion of the Ukrainian 
population – mainly those who did not support nationalist ideas as 
building blocks for a new (or revised) national identity. These develop-
ments revealed the possible transformation of increasing identity tensions 
into long-lasting and deep divides, of ethno-national and ethno-religious 
character. Regarding the essence of the nation-state policies in Ukraine, 
one could recount a typological parallel with the Stuart Croft’s depiction 
of the “Muslim other” in the UK, subdivided into (1) minority “radical” 
other and (2) majority mainstream other, with the former rejected and 
latter accepted (Croft 2012). In the Ukrainian case, clergy and faithful of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were depicted as “aliens” (radical other), 
who had to be marginalised and eventually replaced by more “patriotic” 
Church, acceptable to the ruling political elites and their domestic and 
foreign policies. 
	
2. An Autocephalic Movement and the Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
The Ukrainian authorities, starting from the first months of 
independence in Ukraine, generally favoured autocephalous ideas, al-
though the level of their support varied. The first Ukrainian President, 
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Kravchuk (1991-1994) contributed to the split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy in 
1992, giving his support to Philaret (Denisenko), who established a new 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine—Kiev Patriarchate, not recognised by the 
Orthodox Churches worldwide (Risu.org.ua 2011). In 1993, Kravchuk sent 
his representative, Deputy Prime Minister Zhilinskiy to discuss this issue 
with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul. However, at that time Patriarch 
Bartholomeos was convinced that the solution to the Ukrainian problem 
was only possible with the cooperation of the Moscow Patriarchate 
(Vlasov 2018). The next President, Kuchma (1994—2004), maintained a 
more balanced position towards autocephaly, although he was gradually 
leaning more in favour of it. Yelenskiy suggests that there was quite a 
subjective and personal reason for the Kuchma’s change in the attitudes 
towards autocephaly. Reportedly, Kuchma was unhappy about paying a 
visit to Jerusalem without “his own” Patriarch, seeing at the same time 
that the heads of state of Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia where 
accompanied by the primates of their own national Churches. In any case, 
at the end of his second term Kuchma expressed his regret that he did not 
manage to gain an autocephalous status for the Orthodox Church in 
Ukraine (Yelenskiy 2018).	
The idea of autocephaly and, in the first instance, the recognition of 
Ukrainian non-canonical Churches became of utmost importance for 
President Yuschenko (2005-2010). In the hope of ensuring support from 
Istanbul, he invited Patriarch Bartholomeos to the 2008 celebrations in 
Kiev, dedicated to the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’. 
Yuschenko personally approached Bartholomeos during his visit to 
Ukraine with a request to grant autocephaly; however, there was no 
response from the Patriarch—neither positive, nor negative. Reportedly, 
Bartholomeos was ready to recognize the non-canonical Churches as a 
part of his Patriarchate, reinstating Kiev Metropolia under his supervision; 
however, this idea was rejected by Philaret who aimed at an independent 
Church. Basically, in 2008 the Ecumenical Patriarch was less willing to 
interfere in Ukrainian religious life: a stark contrast with what happened 
10 years later.	
During the Yanukovich Presidency (2010-2014), there was no support 
for autocephaly at the top political level. However, this changed rapidly 
following the ousting of Yanukovich and the election of a new Parliament 
and President. The Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) elected in 2014 on a post-
Maidan nationalistic wave repeatedly confirmed its consolidated support 
of autocephaly. In June 2016, Verkhovna Rada submitted its appeal to 
Patriarch Bartholomeos, claiming that according to all criteria “Orthodox 
Church in Ukraine is ready … to get the status of the Local Autocephalous 
Church”. By making such an appeal and using such wording in its official 
documents, Parliament implicitly took on the theological function of 
identifying the “readiness” of the Church for obtaining a specific and very 
important ecclesiastical document. This judgment could hardly be appro-
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priate for this or any political body, not composed of theologians and 
experts in canon law. Furthermore, Verkhovna Rada elaborated concrete 
recommendations to Istanbul, asking Ecumenical Patriarch: (1) to cancel 
the decision, taken in 1686 [to pass Kiev Metropolia to Moscow Patriar-
chate]; (2) to convene “all-Ukrainian uniting council to resolve all contro-
versial issues and for the unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy”; and (3) to 
issue Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (Posta-
nova 2016). The Parliament’s resolution was supported by 245 MPs, with 
only 20 MPs voting against.	
Almost two years later, in April 2018 President Poroshenko appealed 
to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos in a two-page letter, in which he 
also requested the issue of a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox 
Church in Ukraine. Speaking as a head of state who “represents its citi-
zens, including those belonging to the Orthodox community”, Poroshenko 
identified Bartholomeos as “the only person in the world” who had the 
right and authority “to solve such [religious] issues”. The President’s 
reasoning was centred on the people's freedoms, rights and sovereignty, 
with the suggestions that the Tomos “will strengthen even more religious 
freedom and inter-confessional peace in Ukraine, and will improve the 
rights and freedoms of [its] citizens”. Besides, Poroshenko specified that 
the Tomos would complete the consolidation of sovereignty and indepen-
dence “in the spiritual dimension” (Poroshenko 2018). This request was 
quickly endorsed by the Parliament: the resolution to support Poro-
shenko’s appeal was registered on 18 April; and on the next day, on 19 
April, it was included in the agenda and endorsed by the vast majority of 
the Members of Parliament, with 268 MPs voting in favour and only 36 
against. Almost all Parliamentary factions unanimously supported the pro-
autocephaly decision; the votes against were mainly coming from the 
“Opposition Bloc”. In the explanatory note for this resolution, MPs poin-
ted to what they regarded as a political role of the Moscow Patriarchate, 
stating that it “more and more often has the nature of the propaganda of 
annexation of Crimea and the support for the armed invasion of Russia in 
the east of our state”. The parliamentarians also specified that there was a 
growing support of autocephaly among the people, as seen “in the recent 
sociological poll”. The declared objective of the resolution was 
predominantly political: to hasten “the change of status of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church and to establish its independence from the aggressor 
state” (Verkhovna Rada Ukraini 2018).	
The April actions of the President and Parliament highlighted the 
substantial degree of mutual agreement of the post-Maidan political elites 
in their quest for autocephaly of the Orthodox Church. To add a religious 
component to this political symbiosis, signatures of the bishops of the Kiev 
Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were 
enclosed with the President’s request (Ukrinform 2018). In principle, the 
2018 autocephalic movement could manifest itself as a reflection of state-
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nation policies, should it gain the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church. However, the lack of this support turned the whole process into 
quite a different enterprise. In fact, the UOC refrained from supporting the 
2018 initiative from the very beginning. After the Parliament’s resolution 
was adopted, the press-service of the UOC specified that the appeals from 
the state authorities to Patriarch Bartholomeos with the requests to grant 
autocephaly can only be regarded as an “abuse of authority” and “inter-
ference in Church affairs” (Strana.ua 2018). Only a handful of its priests 
have publicly supported the move towards autocephaly. This is especially 
meaningful in view of the fact that this Church has retained the largest 
number of practicing Orthodox faithful in Ukraine. Thus, it became a 
unique situation in the history of Orthodoxy and in the global Orthodoxy 
at present: the minority Orthodox groups, heavily supported by the state 
authorities, have aimed at autocephaly, while the majority Church has 
consistently opposed it. The movements of the 19th century, when the 
Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian and Serbian autocephalous Churches were 
established, have not encountered such paradoxical divisions (Damian 
2011). The 19th century autocephalies were gained in the atmosphere of 
the unity of clergy and faithful – a stark contrast to the 21st century 
Ukraine. The establishment (or, more correctly say, imposing) of autoce-
phaly from above, with the opposition from the largest Church in Ukraine, 
has further underlined the artificiality of this process and its conformity 
to the nation-state rather than state-nation policies.	
 
3. UOC as the Largest Church 
The domination of nation-state policies and the construction of the 
“radical other” from the UOC looks like a particularly dubious enterprise 
in these circumstances, given that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
maintains the majority Church’s status. It is not surprising therefore that 
some efforts have been made to prove that the UOC, especially after the 
2014 Revolution of Dignity, ceased to be the largest Church in Ukraine. 
During the Maidan events, the UOC KP and UAOC, as well as Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), were showing their unstinting support to 
protesters, both by declarations and actions. For the UOC, the issue was 
much more delicate, since the faithful of this jurisdiction were on the both 
sides of the conflict—among those who actively supported the protests as 
well as among those who fiercely opposed the change of power in Ukraine 
and did not approve the growing nationalist sentiments. However, since 
the protesters emerged as the winners, it is not surprising that the post-
Maidan authorities were creating less favourable conditions for the UOC 
MP compared to those prior to 2014. As noted earlier, the objective was to 
minimise the influence of the UOC and turn it into the minority Church.	
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Relying on the outcomes of some sociological polls, one could even 
assume that this aim was achieved, but I believe that such reliance 
constitutes a flawed argument. Indeed, the polls have produced contra-
dictory and at times extremely polarised results. On the one hand, 
according to ‘Razumkov Centre’, in 2016 only 14.9% respondents identified 
themselves as affiliated with the UOC, while 25.6% stated that they belong 
to the Kiev Patriarchate. The figures are similar for the year 2018: 12.8%-- 
UOC, 28.7%—KP (Osoblivosti 2018). On the other hand, the ‘Ukrainian 
Sociology Service’ in a poll, conducted in September 2016, identified that 
39.4% of the respondents belong to the UOC, while the belonging to the KP 
was declared by the 25.3% of the respondents (Rian.com.ua 2016). In view 
of these sharply incompatible figures, the statistics for the number of 
religious communities and clergy look more reliable and more 
representative. The latest information is given in Table 1.	
 
Table 1. Religious statistics for Ukraine -- Orthodox (as of January, 2018) 
 Number of 
parishes 
(religious 
organisations) 
Number of priests Number of 
monasteries/mon
ks and nuns 
UOC 12069 12283 251/4412 
KP 5167 3640 62/216 
UAOC 1167 693 12/15 
Source: Religiyniye Organizatsiyi v Ukraine 
	
Here the following should be noted. First, there were no substantial 
changes in these numbers even after 2014, for all three Churches—UOC, KP 
and UAOC. Second, the share of the parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church continues to keep the substantial majority: slightly more than 66 
percent of all Orthodox parishes are in this Church. As for the clergy, the 
share of the priests in the canonical Church is slightly more than 70 
percent. Monks and nuns keep their undisputable loyalty to the UOC: only 
around 5 percent of them chose to be in the Kiev Patriarchate or the 
UAOC. It is therefore pertinent to claim that the most devout Christians, 
the spiritual and intellectual elites of Orthodoxy have remained in the 
canonical Church and refused to change sides. This statistics reflects an 
overwhelming domination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, especially 
in view of the fact that, according to Mitrokhin, the UOC parishes are 
generally more numerous and better attended on Sunday and feast 
services than the parishes of the KP and UAOC. 
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4. The Autocephaly, Confrontation and Intimidation 
The 2018 autocephalic initiative followed, as has been noted, “the 
substantial preparatory work”, and certainly came at the right time for 
Poroshenko. Indeed, on the eve of 2019 elections and in the view of his 
declining popularity, the actions to promote autocephaly could become 
the decisive method by which Poroshenko increased his popular support 
and his chances of re-election. As was admitted by Cyril Hovorun, 
Poroshenko needed “some sort of breakthrough … in the period when the 
country enters the electoral cycle” (Hovorun 2018). Although some 
observers believed that the 2018 appeal for autocephaly would be as 
failing as the previous ones, the reality turned to be sharply different. 
Responding to the April’s request from Kiev, the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
declared that it regards itself as a “true Mother Church” [for Ukraine] and 
decided “to closely communicate and coordinate with its sister Orthodox 
Churches concerning this matter [request for autocephaly]” (Strana.ua 
2018a). The attempts from the Moscow Patriarchate to somehow influence 
Constantinople’s approach did not succeed: even the personal visit of 
Patriarch Cyril to Istanbul on 31 August 2018 and his negotiations with 
Bartholomeos did not alter the latter’s perspectives. Constantinople’s 
decisions were straightforward and decisive; these were coming amid the 
protests from the UOC, which raised its voice against the Presidential-
backed push towards autocephaly and unilateral interference from 
Istanbul in Ukrainian religious life.	
The UOC has already entered into a path of ordeal for its non-
conformist perspective. In fact, this Church became the subject to unpre-
cedented intimidation campaigns soon after the Maidan forces gained 
power in 2014. In principle, the Ukrainian mass-media has never been 
sympathetic towards the UOC (Interview with Vecheria 2016), but this 
degree of antipathy varied. The first strong negativity against the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church was revealed in the early 1990s, when the 
non-canonical Churches as well as the Greek Catholics were actively 
forming their new structures in Ukraine. Indeed, as Metropolitan Antoniy 
(Pakanich), chancellor of the UOC admitted, comparing the present-day 
situation with the events which occurred more than 25 years ago, “there 
was something similar in the 1990s: Churches were captured, priests were 
thrown out, believers were persecuted”. But difference was also observed: 
even in the 1990s, which began the years of the post-Soviet ordeal for the 
UOC, “there was no such an amount of lies against the Church, which we 
have observed now”. As can be seen from the opinion of Metropolitan 
Antoniy, the information attacks against the UOC have climbed to 
unprecedented levels (Mitropolit Antoniy 2016, 1-2).	
In fact, what was happening in Ukraine since 2014 in relation to the 
UOC was the creation of what Croft described as the “other” or even 
“radical other” (Croft 2012). The UOC has always been a part of Ukrainian 
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society, embracing people of different political and ideological views. 
Hovorun claims that two Ukrainian Presidents—Kuchma and Yanukovich 
supported UOC; while Kravchuk and Yuschenko were extending their 
support to the Kiev Patriarchate. However, the deliberate construction of 
an image of an enemy, as radicalized as it is portrayed today, has never 
occurred in the history of independent Ukraine. The accusations, made 
against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, have been persistent, strong and 
radical, involving current relations between Ukraine and Russia, the 
military conflict in the Donbas and the secession of Crimea in 2014. In fact, 
these accusations have been extremely political, with the use of language 
which can only be regarded as hate speech and with speculations which 
are not only hard to prove but are also hard to believe. The Church is 
accused of being a fifth column in Ukraine, of acting in a manner not 
compatible with the interests of the state and Ukrainian people. It is 
depicted as a “Kremlin organisation”, which initiated (or contributed to 
the beginning of) the war in Ukraine, which aims to undermine Ukrainian 
sovereignty and acts against the independent Ukrainian state. The actions 
of the Church are often interpreted in the worst possible manner; 
sometimes ‘facts’ are simply invented, in order to prove the statements 
which would have looked implausible otherwise. According to Oleg 
Denisov, negative information about the UOC has been on the rise: since 
2015 there were about 700 negative and intimidating publications in 
various mass-media (Golos.Ua 2018). In this context, the reasoning of 
Archbishop Kliment Vecheria is quite understandable: „For the whole 
period of the existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the inde-
pendent Ukraine, I could not remember the time when mass-media 
(especially those which are supported by the state) were loyal towards the 
UOC. In general, mass media have been focused on the creation of certain 
bad rep jackets and intrigues, thus raising their ratings on the 
confrontation. Therefore the UOC became a convenient victim, the object 
for manipulations. It happened in the past, but now it has gained a 
tougher character. I can say for sure that one of the central TV channels, 
such as “1+1” regularly publishes information about the Church life and 99 
percent of this information is false” (Interview with Vecheria 2016).	
In most cases, the lies remain unpunished; and even the apologies 
from those who distribute the hate and lies are rare. The constraining 
mechanisms, which somehow worked before 2014, were largely 
abandoned after the Revolution of Dignity, which paved the way for 
certain ideological clichés in relation to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 
This ideological justification is also conveniently used for more radical 
actions, such as the intimidation from authorities and the spread of 
violence. As a testimony to that, from 2014 to 2018 there were around 50 
cases of illegal and violent seizures of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s 
buildings (Zakvasin and Lushnikova 2018).	
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5. The Interference from Istanbul 
In general, the Patriarchate of Constantinople has turned a blind eye 
to these campaigns of intimidation. Instead of supporting the suffering 
UOC, Bartholomeos has proceeded with the autocephalic initiative, 
knowing well that it would be resisted by many Orthodox Ukrainians. In 
early September 2018, he appointed two exarchs in Kiev (Daniil and 
Hilarion), who were tasked with negotiating in Ukraine with the parties 
interested in promoting/acquiring autocephaly. The UOC protested; 
Metropolitan Onufriy (head of Ukrainian Orthodox Church) declined to 
meet these exarchs, and the UOC Synod asked them to leave Ukraine (UOC 
2018). However, one month later the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate, held on 9-11 October in Istanbul, took decisions further propelling 
misunderstandings and conflicts. Constantinople “re-established” its 
Stavropegion in Kiev and cancelled its own 17th century decree, giving the 
Moscow Patriarch the right to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev. The 
Ecumenical Patriarchate reinstated into their ecclesiastical ranks the 
heads of KP and UAOC -- Philaret Denisenko and Makariy Maletich, 
although it did not recognize them as the heads of two independent 
Ukrainian Churches. Interestingly, the same day the decision was 
announced – on 11 October -- Philaret stated that “I have been and I shall 
remain Patriarch”, thus publicly challenging the decision taken in Istanbul 
(Gurianov 2018). The EP’s Synod also underlined that it would “proceed to 
the granting of Autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine” (Ecumenical 
Patriarchate 2018).	
Reacting to these decisions, the Moscow Patriarchate gradually 
loosened its ties with Constantinople. The appointment of exarchs was 
viewed as a gross interference in the canonical territory of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC). In response, Moscow prohibited its hierarchs 
from concelebrating with the hierarchs of Constantinople and withdrew 
from the theological/ecumenical commissions, chaired by the representa-
tives of the Constantinople Patriarchate. The October decisions in Istanbul 
were perceived in Moscow as a decisive unfriendly move against the 
Russian Orthodox Church. At its Synod, held in Minsk on 15 October 2018, 
the ROC decided to break the Eucharistic communion with Constantinople. 
Also, it appealed to other Orthodox Churches to discuss the Ukrainian 
problem with a suggestion to hold a Pan-Orthodox meeting (Russian 
Orthodox Church 2018). The Moscow Patriarchate’s decision was accepted 
by Kiev: at the Bishops’ Council on 13 November, the UOC ceased the 
Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and declared 
the “unlawful interference” of Constantinople as “unacceptable” (Depart-
ment 2018). This break of communion between two Patriarchates has 
continued up to the present day; however, the communion was preserved 
with 13 other local Orthodox Churches. Some of them (Serbian Church and 
Polish Church) have already decided not to recognize the decisions, taken 
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at Constantinople, particularly the reinstating of Philaret and Makariy in 
their ecclesiastical ranks. Metropolitan Sawa, head of the Polish Orthodox 
Church, said that those who are defrocked by the decision of the canonical 
Orthodox Church, will not be recognized “until their repentance” (Inter-
view with Hrycuniak 2018).	
Overall, the 2018 path towards autocephaly was accompanied by 
confrontation and uncooperative language, while the reasoning in favour 
of autocephaly lacked specifically religious arguments. In fact, the reaso-
ning has been overwhelmingly secular: a surprise to those who wished to 
see in an independent Church religious enterprise rather than the 
fulfilling of politicians’ dreams. Poroshenko has repeatedly pointed out 
that the issue is related to “our national security and our defence in the 
hybrid war, because the Kremlin considers the Russian Church as a key 
instrument to exert influence in Ukraine” (Khomenko 2018). Immediately 
after the 11 October decision of the EP’s Synod, Poroshenko declared that 
“The issue of Tomos and Autocephaly … is a matter of our independence, … 
our national security, … our statehood. This is a matter of the entire global 
geopolitics” (President of Ukraine 2018). Interestingly, not only 
politicians, but even some Church leaders spoke in a similar non-religious 
language, putting their vision of the state’s interest in first place. Philaret 
was adamant in claiming that “to save Ukrainian state, we need not only 
strong army, we need Church, for spiritual foundation. To make this 
foundation strong, Orthodoxy should be united, and the Tomos is neces-
sary for that”. In a further confrontational move, Philaret suggested that 
those from the UOC who would refrain from entering a new Church should 
be renamed by a vote in Parliament—as the “Russian Orthodox Church in 
Ukraine”, and should not be allowed to use the word “Ukrainian” in their 
name. He also stated that Lavras in Kiev and Pochaev must belong to the 
[new] Ukrainian Church, emphasizing that “it cannot be otherwise”, even 
if the opinion of monks living in these Lavras is different (Koshkina 2018).	
 
6. Misinformation and Further Division 
The path towards autocephaly, reflecting the politisation of religious 
identities, was accompanied by the proliferation of false and biased 
information. The parties were misquoting each other; there were attempts 
to interpret some decisions and declarations in ways, looking more 
favourable for supporters of autocephaly. In some cases, flawed infor-
mation was created at the top political levels. For instance, the then 
Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Rostislav Pavlenko 
distorted the Polish Orthodox Church’s opinion on the issue, denying the 
existence of the Church’s call to coordinate granting of autocephaly with 
all other Orthodox Churches. In fact, this decision, initially taken in 
Warsaw in May 2018, was further confirmed by the Polish Church in 
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November, at the Bishops’ Council, which clearly stated that a Pan-Ortho-
dox meeting is desirable for the solution of Ukrainian problem (Polski 
Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny 2018). Chairman of Ukrainian 
Parliament, Andrei Parubiy, after paying his visit to Tbilisi, stated that the 
Georgian Patriarch expressed his hope “for the positive solution of this 
issue [autocephaly]”. In reality, the Patriarch did not express any support 
for autocephaly; his assessment was quite neutral and reserved, he only 
spoke about the need “to refrain from premature assessments” (Prav-
mir.Ru 2018).	
Misinterpretations took place even at the level of the Foreign 
Ministry. The Ukrainian Ambassador in Cyprus, after meeting Archbishop 
Chrysostomos II, said that the Church of Cyprus supported autocephaly, 
which was contrary to the information published on the Church’s website 
(SPZh 2018a). Perspectives of the Catholic Church were also presented in a 
distorted way; therefore, the MFA’s statement that the Vatican “respects 
the decision of Ukrainian people regarding the creation of the United 
Local Church” was immediately corrected by the Apostolic Nunciature in 
Kiev, which claimed that “the Holy See never did and has no intention 
whatsoever of expressing any evaluation, in any venue” (Apostolic Nun-
ciature in Ukraine 2018).	
It might be possible that some politicians and civil servants were 
acting in, what they think, were the best interests of Ukraine (at least in 
the way that they understand them). However, they decided to use the 
Church to promote these interests, despite the Church and its faithful 
never having asked for their assistance or their interference. The way that 
was chosen to promote these interests was obviously not acceptable to a 
substantial portion of Orthodox believers and was, in fact, harmful to the 
largest Orthodox Church in Ukraine and its followers. The actions 
undertaken did not lead to unity in Ukraine; in fact the opposite appears 
to be true, as seen from the latest sociological polls. Indeed, in spite of the 
37% support for the establishment of the Single Local Orthodox Church 
[percentage of those who are ‘fully supportive’ as of September 2018], this 
idea has failed to turn into an enterprise, which could potentially unite 
Ukrainians. Arguably, the main cluster of support has formed in the 
western and central regions of Ukraine. This statistically is seen in the 
following: in the western Ukraine, 51% of the respondents are fully 
supportive of the Single Orthodox Church, while in the centre of Ukraine 
this equals to 39%. This decreases to 27% in the southern Ukrainian 
regions and to 25% in the eastern. No information is available for Crimea 
and the parts of Lugansk and Donetsk regions not controlled by the 
Ukrainian government, but it is likely that in these regions the support for 
autocephaly will be negligible.	
The highest support for the Single Orthodox Church has been 
registered, paradoxically, among the non-Orthodox: 64% of Greek 
Catholics are fully supportive of this enterprise. Even among the faithful 
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of Kiev Patriarchate the share of supporters is lower -- 56%, while in the 
UOC it drops to 15%. Also, most people supporting autocephaly are more 
than 51 years old— 44% in this age group support the formation of the 
Single Orthodox Church, while for a younger generation (18-35) this figure 
is only around of 27% (Rating 2018). In view of this data, it is fair to claim 
that the most vivid support for autocephaly is found among those clusters 
of Ukrainian believers who are more favourable towards the nation-state 
policies (the faithful of UGCC and KP). At the same time, one can observe 
that attempts to mobilise all-Ukrainian support for religious purposes, as 
required for politicizing and securitising of religious identities, have 
generally failed.	
 
7. Conclusions 
The religious events of 2018 mean a U-turn in the Church-state and 
inter-jurisdictional relations in Ukraine, as well as the inter-Orthodox 
relations on the global level. It is very unlikely that Ukraine will return 
even to the relative stability of early 2018; most probably, the future will 
bring more uneasiness and trouble. The following should be noted in this 
regard. 
First, in spite of the creation of the (formally) independent Orthodox 
Church in Ukraine, it is very probable that Constantinople will keep its 
firm control over the newly established Church, as envisioned in its 
Statute. Indeed, the Tomos signed by Patriarch Bartholomeos in Istanbul 
on 5 January, 2019 established a high degree of dependency of the OCU on 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate—more substantial than the dependency of 
the UOC on the Moscow Patriarchate. In these circumstances, Constan-
tinople has already encountered resistance from those who wish for real 
Church independence, rather than dependence on another foreign entity, 
this time in Turkey. On the global level, there will be an increasing split 
and growing tensions between the Ecumenical and the Moscow Patri-
archates, with a further distancing between the Churches, which 
accept/reject Constantinople’s approach to Ukraine.  	
Second, the actions of Constantinople, although welcomed by the 
Ukrainian authorities and a fraction of Ukrainian Orthodox, may poten-
tially deepen the divisions in Ukrainian society. It is likely that the vast 
majority of the UOC will remain as it is: in communion with Moscow 
Patriarchate, without changing jurisdiction. However, the enemisation of 
the UOC will probably continue, thus increasing the level of hatred 
towards it and potential violence. Indeed, following the establishment of 
OCU some radical nationalist groups have threatened the UOC and 
attempted to seize some Churches; and at times the local authorities have 
been involved in actions against UOC parishes (Strana.ua 2019). It is 
therefore logical to expect that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be 
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continuously featured as a “radical other”; however, it will equally 
continue to enjoy the support of a substantial portion of Ukrainians. As a 
result, the new dividing lines will further alienate people from different 
regions and different Church jurisdictions in Ukraine, pushing aside the 
prospects for unity and reconciliation. 	
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